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ERISA SECTION 104(b)(4): WHAT DOCUMENTS DO
EMPLOYEES HAVE A RIGHT TO DEMAND FROM
THEIR EMPLOYERS?
The American worker has an undeniable fear regarding his
future pension benefits.- As the following sample demonstrates,
this fear has manifested itself frequently in all parts of the coun-
try: the Santa Fe New Mexican reported that state prison guards
fear the loss of their pensions under a new system;' the Cin-
cinnati Business Courier recently wrote about hospital employ-
ees who fear a loss of their pension funds under the hospital's
privatization plan;2 the Spartanburg Herald-Journal reported
that Buffalo mill workers recently received notice that their
pensions "are in jeopardy."' The fear of pension loss extends
beyond just small pockets of individual workers. Some claim
that uncertainty about pensions partially explains flagging con-
sumer confidence in 1995.'
The University of Wisconsin published a recent study on the
length of time spent at one job by the average American work-
er.5 The study showed that job mobility greatly decreases in
pension-covered jobs.6 According to the authors, this study con-
firmed the conclusions of other studies that pension benefits
have a greater impact on worker retention than an added dollar
of wage, longer tenure, or union membership.'
Are workers' fears over the possible loss of benefits unfound-
1. See Mark Oswald, Officials Differ on Private Prison Costs, SANTA FE NEW
MEXIcAN, Aug. 30, 1996, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newmex File.
2. See Dan Monk, Hospital Plan Faces Foes, 15 CIN. Bus. COURIER, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File.
3. Clay Murphy, Ex-Buffalo Mill Workers Fear Loss of Pensions, SPARTANBURG
HERALD-J., Dec. 1, 1995, at C3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File.
4. See Dick Marlowe, Crumbling Consumer Confidence May Be Worth Money in
the Bank, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 31, 1995, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Orsent File (noting that "the prospect of early retirement to a life of fun and
sun is only a fading memory from the high-rolling 1980s").
5. See Steven G. Allen et al., Pensions, Bonding, and Lifetime Jobs, 28 J. OF
HUm. REsouRcEs 463, 463-64 (1993).
6. See id. at 464.
7. See id.
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ed? Varity Corp. v. Howe8 would seem to suggest otherwise. In
Varity, the employer misrepresented the financial situation of a
functionally insolvent subsidiary.9 The employer's goal was to
encourage workers to shift their nonpension benefits from a sol-
vent subsidiary to a newly-incorporated, money-losing subsidiary
in order to release the solvent subsidiary from the obligation to
pay these benefits."0 In an unprecedented decision, the Su-
preme Court allowed workers an individual remedy under sec-
tion 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in order to provide equitable relief for these workers."
The fear of losing pension and welfare benefits also has re-
sulted in litigation initiated by workers who demand disclosure
by their employer of documents under ERISA section
104(b)(4) 2 which would allow them to monitor their pension
plans in order to avoid the Varity scenario. This Note examines
the implications of ERISA for a worker seeking full document
disclosure. The first section presents an overview of ERISA,
explaining its basic structure and the plans that can be con-
structed under the statute. The next section analyzes recent
court decisions regarding disclosure requirements under ERISA
section 104(b)(4) and discusses the current circuit split involving
this section.'" The third section addresses Department of Labor
(DOL) opinion letters written in response to attorneys seeking to
advise clients regarding disclosure obligations.
This Note then turns to an analysis of the traditional judicial
methods of statutory interpretation in the area: first, a
textualist approach, and second, an approach that looks to legis-
lative history and to the purposes of ERISA. This section also
critiques both methods in order to demonstrate that although
both methods of statutory interpretation are useful, neither is
8. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
9. See id. at 1069.
10. See id. at 1068-69.
11. See id. at 1079.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1994).
13. See Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 140 (2d
Cir. 1997); Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 651-52 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997); Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes,
72 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1676 (1996);
Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp. 29 F.3d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1994).
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able to address disclosure requirements adequately under the
statute. Finally, this Note proposes a third-tier pragmatic judi-
cial inquiry as an alternate method of interpreting the ERISA
disclosure requirements. This section specifically includes a five-
part inquiry that courts should use to review litigation and ad-
dresses the possibility of congressional intervention by way of
amending ERISA if this dilemma remains unresolved by the
courts.
AN OVERVIEW OF ERISA
Before President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law in
1974,14 the gift theory predominated in the area of pension ben-
efits: employers could choose to provide benefits but could set
any limits they thought appropriate. 5 This laissez-faire ap-
proach, however, allowed 6,900 Studebaker Corporation employ-
ees to lose their pensions in 1963 because of an underftinded
plan. 6 The outcry over the Studebaker debacle inspired Con-
gress to draft federal pension legislation.'7
ERISA's passage in 1974 marked a new era for pension bene-
fits, but was certainly not the end of pension woes: Congress
created what many criticized as one of the most complex stat-
utes in existence. 8 ERISA's complexity is due partly to the fact
that it displaced all state law with a broad preemption clause
14. See Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36
B.C. L. REV. 201, 204 (1995).
15. See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Con-
tract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 183
(1995).
16: See Muir, supra note 14, at 203.
17. See id. at 203-04.
18. See H.R. DoC. NO. 95-375, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9814,
9815 (detailing a 1978 message of President Carter to Congress, in which the Presi-
dent stated that "ERISA has been a symbol of unnecessarily complex government
regulation"); see also Paul J. Fasser, Jr., The New Pension Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 59, 59
(Richard Adehnan ed., 1975) (referring to ERISA as "one of the most complex laws
ever enacted by Congress").
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necessary to foster a uniform system. 9 The five primary goals
of ERISA are to protect workers, to improve the design and
regulation of pensions, to enforce worker pension rights, to pro-
vide insurance for workers who lose their pensions,0 and to
encourage the formation of new plans.2'
ERISA is divided into four titles. Title I explains the reporting
and disclosure requirements.22 In addition, Title I defines and
establishes requirements for: participation and vesting;' fund-
ing;' fiduciary responsibility;' and administration and en-
forcement." Title II amends the Internal Revenue Code to pro-
vide qualified plans with tax advantages. 7 Title III describes
the authority given to various federal departments for ERISA.2 s
Title IV provides for the termination of plans and creates the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) to administer
federally guaranteed pensions.29
ERISA plans involve four major parties: the employer, who
makes contributions; the plan administrator, who, as the name
denotes, administers the plan; the trustee, who invests the
plan's assets or chooses another to invest assets; and the worker,
who is the beneficiary of the plan.3" There are two basic types
of pension plans. The first, originally popular, and hence the
plan type originally targeted by Congress,"' is the defined bene-
19. See Fisk, supra note 15, at 162.
20. See John R. Keville, Note, Retire At Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return on In-
vestment, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 527, 533 (1994).
21. See Muir, supra note 14, at 204 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)); see also H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, pt. 1, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640 (list-
ing as one of Congress's goals the promotion of "a renewed expansion of private re-
tirement plans").
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
23. See id. §§ 1051-1061.
24. See id. §§ 1081-1086.
25. See id. §§ 1101-1114.
26. See id. §§ 1131-1145.
27. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829, 898-994 (1974) (codified as amended in various sections of I.R.C. (1994)).
28. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1994).
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1994).
30. See generally Robert R. Frei & James G. Archer, Taxation and Regulation of
Pension Plans Under the Internal Revenue Code, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 691, 692-93 (dis-
cussing the tax consequences of pension plans for both employers and employees).
31. See Keville, supra note 20, at 535-36.
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fit plan. This plan promises the worker a certain amount, based
on a plan formula,32 which is calculated by an actuary based on
factors such as age, years of service with the employer, and the
final average salary during a specified period.33 Under a de-
fined benefit plan, the employer bears the risk of loss because
the employer must pay set benefits even if the investments are
unsuccessful.'
The current trend among employers is to utilize the second
type, the defined contribution plan, 5 which takes much the
opposite approach. In a defined contribution plan, the employer
contributes to an individual account established for each work-
er."6 The worker's benefits depend on the value of the account,
which varies with the success of investments made on the plan's
behalf.37 Employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) are a prima-
ry example of the defined contribution plan: the employer con-
tributes to the worker's account and then invests the funds in
the employer's own stock.3" Under the defined contribution
plan, the worker bears the risk of loss because the calculation of
benefits is equal to contributions plus or minus the investment
returns. 9 The current trend toward defined contribution plans
and the resulting shift in the risk of loss have created a focus on
the disclosure requirement of Title I.
The goal behind the disclosure requirement is clear. In the
statute, Congress stated its policy "that disclosure be made and
safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, opera-
tion, and administration of such plans" and "to protect.., the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
32. See Muir, supra note 14, at 205.
33. See id.
34. See d. at 206.
35. See Keville, supra note 20, at 535, 541-42 (citing three reasons for the shift to
defined contribution plans: (1) a lower amount of government regulation, (2) the shift
toward a greater number of small employers, and (3) the increased mobility of the
American worker since World War II).
36. See Muir, supra note 14, at 205.
37. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994)).
38. See Kevile, supra note 20, at 529 n.15.
39. See Muir, supra note 14, at 205.
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beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to partic-
ipants and beneficiaries."40 The basic purpose of disclosure,
therefore, was to allow both participants and beneficiaries to
review the method by which their plan was administered in
order to arm them with the knowledge necessary to ensure com-
pliance with ERISA.4 ' The crucial role that disclosure plays is
demonstrated through the onslaught of litigation occurring over
the issue.
AN EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
A split currently exists among four circuits regarding the dis-
closure requirements under ERISA section 104(b)(4). In Bartling
v. Fruehauf Corp.,42 the Sixth Circuit initially interpreted
ERISA section 104(b)(4) to allow broad disclosure to partici-
pants.43 In Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of
Hughes,' the Ninth Circuit originally followed suit and held in
favor of broad disclosure in its initial hearing of the matter.5
The court revisited the issue en bane, however, and vacated the
earlier decision of the court's initial three-judge panel.' In
Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,47 the Fourth Circuit followed
the Ninth Circuit's analysis and narrowly interpreted the statuto-
ry disclosure requirement, denying workers access to several
documents.48 Most recently, the Second Circuit similarly decided
in favor of narrow ERISA section 104(b)(4) disclosure require-
ments in Board of Trustees of the CWAIITU v. Weinstein.49
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (1994).
41. For a discussion of the policy arguments in favor of broader disclosure, see
Brief of Appellants at 17, Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648 (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-1275), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
42. 29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1994).
43. See id. at 1070 (stating "all other things being equal, courts should favor dis-
closure where it would help participants understand their rights").
44. 39 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated en banc, 72 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1996).
45. See id. at 1006-07.
46. 72 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1676
(1996).
47. 91 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
48. See 'id. at 654 (rejecting the broad interpretation given the statute in
Bartling).
49. 107 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp.
In Bartling, a subsidiary of the Fruehauf Corporation
("Fruehauf) announced the termination of its pension plan and
the formation of another in the following year.0 Fruehauf pre-
sented a videotape and booklet explaining the termination for its
workers.5 The workers also received benefit commitment let-
ters, which described monthly benefits along with the method of
their calculation.5 2 In the midst of these changes, Fruehauf also
began discussing the sale of a division of its subsidiary to anoth-
er company.5" In the current climate of fear about pensions,
workers in the division apparently became nervous and re-
quested several documents regarding the pension plan.'
Fruehauf furnished the plan participants with the following
documents: the plan itself; amendments to the plan; the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) tax determination letter;55 filings with
the IRS and the PBGC relating to the Plan; the Form 5500 for
the past three years;5 and the most recent summary plan de-
scription (SPD).5" Fruehauf also offered to provide benefit cal-
50. See Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1994).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See [1997] 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 44, 360.01-.02. If a plan is tax
qualified, it has satisfied the Internal Revenue Code requirements necessary to re-
ceive the tax advantages of Title H of ERISA. Those preferences are the following.
(1) the earnings and invested funds are not taxable; (2) the employer's contributions
are deductible from its gross federal income tax; and (3) the employer's contributions
are not taxable to the workers. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 404 (1994); [1997] 6 Stand. Fed.
Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 17, 507.01-.04.
56. Plans with 100 or more participants use the Form 5500 for annual reporting
purposes. See LINDA PANSZCZYK & JAN GERSTEIN, 1996 U.S. MASTER EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS GUIDE 40 (1995). The Form 5500 is a type of notice statement. It does not
contain financial information. See Disclosure of Plan Information to Participants and
Beneficiaries, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,339, 68,341 (1993) (proposed Dec. 27, 1993).
57. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1065-66. As is evidenced by the title, the SPD is
meant to provide a summary of the plan in language that can be understood by the
average participant. See PANSZCZYK & GERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 36. It includes a
statement of the participant's rights under ERISA, including: (1) the duties of fidu-
ciaries; (2) the right to benefit status information; (3) the right to obtain more plan
17471998]
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culations upon receipt of individual authorizations from partici-
pants in the plan."5 Fruehauf, however, refused to provide an
actual copy of the benefit calculations, which the workers needed
to verify their monthly letters.59 Fruehauf also refused to pro-
vide actuarial reports, the specification sheet used to solicit
insurance company bids, and provisions in the purchase
agreement relating to pension and welfare benefits."
ERISA section 104(b)(4) provides for the following
disclosure:
The administrator shall, upon written request of any partici-
pant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated sum-
mary plan description, plan description, and the latest annu-
al report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement,
trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which
the plan is established or operated.61
Certain documents are specified, but the final, ambiguous clause
is at the center of the dispute. In Bartling, for example, the
issue was whether the three contested documents were "instru-
ments under which the plan is established or operated."62
The Sixth Circuit held that the actuarial valuation report was a
document under which the plan was operated. 3 The court first
used a plain meaning approach-it decided that because the actu-
information; (4) the right to be free of retaliation for exercising rights; and (5) spe-
cifically the right to bring lawsuits. See id. at 37. The SPD should also contain the
procedure for presenting claims and the remedies available under ERISA. See id
58. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1066.
59. See id. Fruehauf claimed that the calculations were computer generated and
that no actual copies of the worksheets existed.
60. See id. at 1065-66.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
62. Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1069. The court also addressed at some length the sepa-
rate issue of the amount of damages to be assessed against Fruehauf for failure to
disclose required documents. See id. at 1069. ERISA section 502(c)(1)(B) provides
that defendants can be assessed up to $100 per day per document from the date of
refusal. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) (1994). This issue will not be addressed in the
above discussion because there is no split among the circuits: in the absence of a
clear abuse of discretion, a court of appeals will not review the decision of a lower
court. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1068-69.
63. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1070.
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arial valuation report is required for every third plan year,6
these reports are indispensable to the operation of the plan, and
therefore were included under a literal interpretation of the
phrase "instruments under which the plan is... operated.6 5
The court also discussed the legislative history regarding the
purpose of the ERISA disclosure requirements.66 In support of
its decision to allow disclosure of the actuarial valuation report,
the court cited the following language from the congressional
report: "Mhe purpose of ERISA's disclosure requirements is to
ensure that 'the individual participant knows exactly where he
stands with respect to the plan."' The court interpreted this
statement to favor broad disclosure if it will help participants
understand their rights.6
The Sixth Circuit addressed why the participants were not
entitled to a copy of the purchase agreement for the division of
the subsidiary at which they worked.69 Again employing a liter-
al interpretation of the relevant provision, the court determined
that the plan was neither established nor operated under the
purchase agreement."0 The court implicitly recognized that the
participants did not need the purchase agreement in order to
monitor their plan.7
The court did allow the participants to access the benefit cal-
culation procedure.72 The court found that the company "knew or
should have known" that they were obligated to provide the calcu-
lation procedure used to determine participant benefits.7" The
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (1994).
65. Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1070.
66. See id.
67. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CA.N. 4639, 4649).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. The reason for this determination was a purely factual matter: the plan ad-
dressed in the purchase agreement was not the same plan that was the source of
the litigation, so its disclosure would not serve a monitoring purpose. See id.
72. See id. at 1070-71.
73. See id. at 1071.
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court did so in a conclusory fashion, however, without specifically
referring to the previously addressed statutory interpretation.74
Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes
The Ninth Circuit faced a very different set of facts than those
reviewed by the Sixth Circuit. The plaintiffs in Hughes were re-
tired workers receiving benefits under a defined benefit pension
plan.75 The workers were part of a self-appointed committee
which requested that the plan administrator furnish them with
the names and addresses of the other 10,000 retired participants
in order to communicate with them regarding the plan
administrator's allegedly unlawful use of plan assets to meet the
company's funding obligations; to gain support for negotiating
with, or, if necessary, litigating against the plan in order to
obtain increased benefits; and to monitor the plan.7"
The procedural posture of Hughes highlights the more promi-
nent circuit split over the disclosure requirements under ERISA
section 104(b)(4). The district court dismissed the case for failure
to state a claim," but a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court.7" The Ninth Circuit then voted to
rehear the case sitting en banc79 and, in a five-to-four decision,
reversed its own three-judge panel."
The primary issue before the Ninth Circuit en banc was
whether ERISA section 104(b)(4) required the disclosure of the
names and addresses of the other retired workers as documents
"under which the plan is established or operated.""' The court
74. The only argument raised by Fruehauf as to why it refused to provide the
calculation procedure was that the participants failed to ask for the procedure by
name. See id. at 1070-71. The court stated that to deny the participants access to
the document on these grounds would be contrary to the "spirit" of the disclosure
provision. See id. at 1071.
75. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686, 688
(9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1676 (1996).
76. See id. at 688.
77. See id. at 688-89.
78. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 39 F.3d 1002, 1006-
07 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated en banc, 72 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
79. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 53 F.3d 1090 (9th
Cir. 1995).
80. See Hughes, 72 F.3d at 688-89.
81. Id. at 689. The court also spent a significant amount of time addressing
1750
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held that disclosure of the names and addresses was not re-
quired because the plain language of the statute limited docu-
ments to those similar to the documents specifically identified in
the statute.82 The court thus reversed the three-judge panel
even though under a literal interpretation of the statute, the
names and addresses of the retired beneficiaries are necessary
to operate the plan. Without that information, the plan adminis-
trator would not know where and to whom benefit checks were
to be sent.s3 The court concluded its plain meaning analysis by
stating that ERISA does not provide for the disclosure of the list
of names because "[it] provides participants with absolutely no
information whatsoever about the plan."' The court made clear
that it would not define precisely what information would fall
under ERISA section 104(b)(4), leaving that issue open for a doc-
ument-by-document analysis.s
The Ninth Circuit's analysis mirrors that of the Sixth Circuit
more than by simply beginning with a plain meaning approach.
The court in Hughes went on to cite the identical language from
the legislative history previously cited by the Sixth Circuit in
denying the plaintiffs access to the names.86 The court conclud-
whether the plan administrator had a fiduciary duty to disclose the documents un-
der ERISA section 404. See id. at 691-95. After a lengthy discussion, the court re-
jected the argument, stating that the common law of trusts imposes no obligation on
a trustee to disclose names and addresses of beneficiaries "in the absence of special
circumstances such as voting rights or the need to obtain other beneficiaries' consent
to initiate litigation." Id. at 694 n.6. The Hughes dissenters disagreed and dissented
in part on the ground that ERISA section 404 does impose a general fiduciary duty
to disclose because a special circumstance exists when ERISA participants seek to
communicate with other participants and to monitor their benefits. See id. at 696
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
Addressing ERISA section 404 issues is outside the scope of this Note, however,
because there is not a circuit split over the issue. The Sixth Circuit, in finding a
broad disclosure requirement, did so solely on the basis of ERISA section 104(b)(4).
See Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994).
82. See Hughes, 72 F.3d at 691.
83. The dissent pointed to this as an argument in favor of disclosure. See id. at
697 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 689 (quoting Order of Dismissal, No. CV-91-00335-RAG (C.D. Cal. July
9, 1991) (unpublished opinion)).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 690 ("As the legislative history bears out, the documents contem-
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ed its discussion of the statute by addressing the test used by
the three-judge panel to allow disclosure. The panel required
disclosure of all documents "critical to the operation of a
plan.""7 The en banc opinion explained that such a broad stan-
dard would allow for general disclosure of documents subject
only to specified limits.8 " The court held instead that the stat-
ute and legislative history indicate that ERISA section 104(b)(4)
conversely requires general nondisclosure subject only to the
enumerated exceptions, and hence that the catch-all end provi-
sion applies only to other similar documents."
Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.
The Fourth Circuit also has weighed in on the ongoing argu-
ment over how much information employers must disclose to
participants under ERISA section 104(b)(4). In Faircloth, the
three employees were participants in an ESOP.' The employ-
er, Lundy Packing Co. (Lundy), a closely-held corporation,
established the ESOP in 1976 and allowed employees to partic-
ipate after one year with the company. 1 The ESOP, a defined
contribution plan, maintained individual accounts for each
employee on an annual basis.92 The majority of the ESOP as-
sets were invested in Lundy stock, which was valued through
plated by § 104(b)(4) are those that allow 'the individual participant [to] knowU ex-
actly where he stands with respect to the plan. .. .') (quoting S. REP. No. 127, at
27 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4863); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 67 (relating Sixth Circuit's citation of same language).
87. Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 39 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th
Cir. 1994), vacated en banc, 72 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
88. See Hughes, 72 F.3d at 691.
89. See id. The four dissenting justices in Hughes made the same arguments un-
der ERISA section 104(b)(4) as were made by the three-judge panel; two of the four
dissenting judges, Judges Pregerson and Fletcher, were part of the initial panel.
Compare id. at 697-98 (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting) with Hughes, 39 F.3d at 1007-08
(arguing that a mailing list of plan participants is critical to the operation of the
plan).
90. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
91. See id.
92. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing defined con-
tribution plans).
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an independent appraisal."
In 1992, the workers were informed that the value of the
Lundy stock had dropped by forty-two percent, and, as a result,
their account values had dropped. 4 During this same time peri-
od, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW)
was conducting a campaign to organize the workers."s The
workers requested assistance from the UFCW representative to
help them understand the precipitous drop in their account
values.9 " The union representative helped the participants pre-
pare letters to send to the company requesting several plan and
company documents. s7 Lundy provided the participants with
the plan document, the trust agreement," the latest SPD, and
the last three summary annual reports (SAR).9s After the par-
ticipants filed suit, Lundy also provided them with the last three
Form 5500s.'0 0
Lundy refused to provide the following documents: the IRS
determination letter; the bonding policy covering the ESOP and
its fiduciaries; the appraisal reports and supporting documenta-
tion; the minutes of meetings regarding the ESOP during the
last three years; and the investment, funding, cost-sharing, and
trustee expense policies.'0 '
The Fourth Circuit used its own version of the plain meaning
93. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 651.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 651-52.
98. The trust agreement existed because ERISA specifies that all plan assets must
be held in trust. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
99. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 652. The SAR contains the following information: the
type of funding arrangement; the amount of plan and administrative expenses; the
total number of participants and beneficiaries; the value of the plan assets at the
beginning and end of the year, the amount of increases and decreases in net assets;
and total income, with a breakdown for the percentage of employer contributions,
employee contributions, gains or losses from the sale of assets, and investment earn-
ings. See Disclosure of Plan Information to Participants & Beneficiaries, 58 Fed. Reg.
68,339, 68,341 (1993) (proposed Dec. 27, 1993).
100. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 652.
101. See id.
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approach to determine that Lundy was not obligated to disclose
the majority of the documents. Using a formalistic approach, the
court defined each term of the phrase "other instruments under
which the plan is established or operated."" 2 The court saw no
reason to examine legislative history or to employ other rules of
statutory construction, because the language at issue was "un-
ambiguous."'0
The majority agreed specifically with the Hughes decision that
ERISA section 104(b)(4) should be construed as a nondisclosure
provision unless the document at issue is similar to those enu-
merated in the provision. 0 4 The court went so far as to say
that because the Sixth Circuit found in favor of a presumption of
disclosure, "we do not find Bartling persuasive."0 5
Although the court refused to engage in a review of legislative
history or other methods of statutory construction, it noted that,
"if Congress intended for section 104(b)(4) to encompass all docu-
ments that provide information about the plan and benefits,
Congress could have used language to that effect."0 6 After in-
terpreting the statutory language, the court made several deci-
sions regarding the plaintiffs' requests for specific documents.
First, because the IRS determination letter showed only that the
ESOP is tax-qualified, the court held that the letter did not "set
up or manage" the ESOP, and hence that no disclosure was
required.' ° Second, the bonding policy0 8 was denied on the
same ground.' 9
The court specifically addressed the appraisal or valuation
reports of Lundy stock and the supporting financial documents.
Again, the ESOP was not set up or managed under these reports
because the documents "simply derive[d] the value of Lundy
102. Id. at 653.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 654 ("[Section] 104(b)(4) requires the disclosure of only the docu-
ments described with particularity and 'other instruments' similar in nature.") (quot-
ing Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1676 (1996)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The bonding policy insures the ESOP against fiduciary misconduct. See id.
109. See id.
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stock.""' The court did not discuss disclosure of the trustee
meeting minutes of the previous three years under section
104(b)(4) because it found the request too broad without further
clarification of what the participants wanted."' The court
made an exception for the funding and investment policies, to
which it held the participants were entitled."' The court's the-
ory was that because these policies set forth "Lundy's obligations
to fund the ESOP and explain the responsibilities regarding
investing the assets of the ESOP," both were formal documents
under which the ESOP is governed."'
Although Judge Michael agreed with the majority in some
respects," he concurred only in part and dissented from the
majority's interpretation of section 104(b)(4)." 5 Judge Michael's
opinion represented the first time a judge made no attempt to
construe the plain meaning of the statute."' To Judge Michael,
the words of the key phrase "instruments under which the plan
is established or operated" clearly were ambiguous." 7 In ex-
plaining his approach, Judge Michael made a classic argument
in favor of the use of legislative history in lieu of "the mechani-
110. Id. at 655.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 656.
113. Id. The court concluded, however, that the participants were not entitled to
the cost-sharing and trustee expense policies. The court based its decision, in part,
on the fact that the participants had refused to clarify to the plan administrator
what was meant by the term "cost-sharing policy" and because there was no indica-
tion that a trustee expense policy existed. See id. at 655-56.
114. Judge Michael agreed with the majority that ERISA section 404 did not create
any disclosure requirements under the fiduciary duty provision because the more
general section 404 cannot control the more specific ERISA section 104(b)(4). See id.
at 661 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, Judge
Michael agreed with the majority that the plan was not obligated to disclose cost-
sharing policies, trustee expense policies, and trustees' meeting minutes for the rea-
sons stated by the majority. See id. at 659 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
115. See id. at 659 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686 (9th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1076 (1996); Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp.,
29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1994).
117. Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 660 n.1 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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cal application of dictionary definitions.""'
After construing the legislative history, Judge Michael deter-
mined that "instruments" must be defined more broadly because
participants are entitled to understand where they stand with
respect to the plan.' According to Judge Michael, participants
need enough information to enforce their rights and those of the
plan. 2
0
His dissent concentrated on the implications of participating
in a defined contribution plan such as an ESOP.R " ' Judge Mi-
chael stressed that ESOP participants are subject to a double
risk of loss, which is even more pronounced than the normal
defined contribution plan: first, contrary to the normal portfolio
theory that diversification is necessary to spread risks, ESOP
assets are not diversified,'22 and second, the workers may also
lose their current employment as a result of the company fail-
ure.2 He argued that the possibility of double loss was keenly
demonstrated by a forty percent drop in account value in a sin-
118. Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent,
Judge Michael elaborated on his method of statutory interpretation:
It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide
it by a process of etymological dissection, and to separate words and
then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular defi-
nition given by lexicographers and then reconstruct the instrument upon
the basis of these definition. An instrument must always be construed as
a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or
phrase is usually to be ascribed from the context, the nature of the sub-
ject matter treated of, and the purpose or intention of the parties who
executed the contract or of the body which enacted or framed the statute
or constitution.
Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992)
(citation omitted)).
119. Judge Michael looked to the same legislative history as was reviewed in both
Hughes and Bartling-that a participant has a right to know "exactly where he
stands with respect to the plan." Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting S. REP. No. 127, at 27 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CJAN. 4838,
4863; see also supra text accompanying notes 67, 86 (quoting this language).
120. See id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. See id. at 661-63 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing defined contribution plans).
122. See id. at 662 (Michael, J., concurring in part and.dissenting in part).
123. See id. at 662-63 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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gle year.' Judge Michael explained that a request for broad
disclosure by participants in a plan that had dropped by forty
percent made even more sense in light of the fact that the em-
ployer had net earnings of nearly two million dollars in the
same year.'
Stressing the above factors, Judge Michael argued for greater
disclosure. First, similar to the Sixth Circuit, he stated that the
participants had a right to the IRS determination letter because
the ESOP had to be tax-qualified in order to operate.2 Be-
cause plan fiduciaries must be bonded, the bonding policy was
also an instrument under which the ESOP is operated, according
to the dissent. 27 Judge Michael also asserted that the apprais-
al reports and supporting documentation were instruments un-
der which the plan was operated because the valuation deter-
mines the price at which the plan purchases company stock, and
it is on the basis of these valuations that the administrator
values the employees' accounts."
Judge Michael ended his discussion of ERISA section 104(b)(4)
by discussing the limitations of the provision. 9 He argued
specifically that participants' right to inspect corporate docu-
ments should be the same as that afforded to shareholders. 130
Judge Michael would have allowed nondisclosure if the company
demonstrated a valid reason of the need for confidentiality.1
3
'
As Lundy had already offered the requested information to other
participants, the dissent felt that the company had not demon-
124. See id. at 663 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 663 n.2 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. See id. at 664 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. See id. at 665 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See id (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (Michie 1991) (stating that shareholders are entitled to
business records upon demonstration of a proper purpose related to the shareholder's
business interests).
131. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 665 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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strated a need for confidentiality.1 2
Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU v. Weinstein
The Second Circuit has most recently addressed the issue of
document disclosure under section 104(b)(4). The Weinstein facts
were limited and straightforward. Weinstein was a retiree who
had participated in a pension plan since 1969."' In 1995, he
wrote to the plan administrator, Foss, to request copies of the
plan's annual reports and actuarial valuation reports for the
years 1992 through 1994 because he feared that his pension
benefits were being reduced as a result of improper actuarial
allocations of pension-plan contributions."'
Foss forwarded copies of the annual reports to Weinstein but
refused to send him copies of the actuarial valuation reports."'
Foss's reasoning was that the actuarial valuation reports were
"'largely duplicative' of the information in the actuarial state-
ments" of the annual reports that Weinstein had already re-
ceived."' According to Foss, the actuarial valuation reports
were also unnecessary because the information included was
"statistical, highly technical, quite voluminous and... unlikely
to provide further clarification of the Plan's funding status.""7
Foss sent Weinstein a copy of the most recent actuarial valua-
tion report's table of contents and asked Weinstein to identify
the specific information in which he was interested."'
Weinstein persisted in his requests until June 1995, when the
board of trustees of the plan and Foss (the "administrators")
filed suit to request a declaratory judgment that ERISA does not
require disclosure of actuarial valuation reports."'
The Second Circuit quickly dismissed Weinstein's procedural
132. See id. at 665 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. See Board of Trustees of CWA/ITU v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir.
1997).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id. (quoting response of Foss).
137. Id. (quoting response of Foss).
138. See id.
139. See id.
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challenges,' 40 and addressed the issue presented by section
104(b)(4) at length." Citing the Fourth Circuit's Faircloth de-
cision, the court began its analysis of section 104(b)(4) with a
review of the dictionary definitions of the term "instrument."42
The Second Circuit found that the term connotes a formal legal
document, and that only documents similar to the category of
documents enumerated in section 104(b)(4)-specifically, plan
descriptions, summary plan descriptions, the latest annual re-
port, terminal reports, the bargaining agreement, trust agree-
ments and contracts-must be disclosed to participants.
The Second Circuit also contrasted the language in section
104(b)(4) with that found in other sections of the statute.' In
sections requiring disclosure to regulatory agencies, the wording
of the disclosure provisions is far broader, including for example
"reports, books, and records."'45 The court found that by com-
parison the mere term "instruments" was far more narrow.46
The Second Circuit continued its analysis by examining the
legislative history of section 104(b)(4).'47 According to the
court, the legislative history revealed that participants must
receive information from the plan regarding their rights and
remedies rather than the technical data contained in actuarial
valuation reports. 4 '
The court found that the reports in question contained perti-
nent information about a plan, but that the administrators were
not bound by this information.'49 As the actuarial valuation
reports did not bind the administrators, they were more akin to
a status report or an advisory opinion than to a formal legal
140. See id. at 142.
141. See id. at 142-47.
142. See id. at 142-44.
143. See id. at 143 (listing documents enumerated in section 104(b)(4)).
144. See id.
145. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1134(a)(1) (1994) (regarding disclosure to be made to
the Secretary of Labor)).
146. See id.
147. See id. at 143.
148. See id. at 143-44.
149. See id. at 144.
1998] 1759
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1741
document. 5 ' As a result, section 104(b)(4) did not require dis-
closure of the reports. 5' The court concluded its analysis by
noting that its holding did not conflict with the Internal Reve-
nue Code requirements and by dismissing the broader language
used in Department of Labor opinion letters because none of the
letters specifically addressed actuarial valuation reports.'52
In the final portion of the opinion, the court addressed
Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., noting that the Sixth Circuit previ-
ously reached a contrary result regarding the disclosure of actu-
arial valuation reports.'5' The Second Circuit explicitly dis-
agreed with the Sixth Circuit, stating that under the test ap-
plied in Bartling, "virtually any report or record generated in
the administration of a pension plan might be subject to disclo-
sure."'54 The court concluded its analysis by dismissing the use
of section 404, which sets out general fiduciary duties of loyalty
and prudence, as a means for requiring disclosure.' 5
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S STANCE ON THE ISSUE
The advisory opinion letters written by DOL in response to
private attorneys' requests for clarification in specific instances
also form part of the framework within which ERISA section
104(b)(4) should be analyzed. According to the approach estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,' federal courts must follow an
agency's interpretation of a statute if the interpretation is con-
sistent with clearly expressed congressional intent. 5' If, how-
ever, congressional intent is ambiguous, then the courts must
defer to the agency's permissive construction of the statute.5 8
150. See id. at 145.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 145-46.
153. See id. at 146 (citing Bartling v. Fruehauf Co., 29 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.
1994)).
154. Id. at 146.
155. See id. The court regarded the use of section 404 to be an inappropriate
means for finding disclosure requirements because the section states nothing specifi-
cally about disclosure. See id. at 147.
156. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
157. See id. at 842-43.
158. See id. at 844-45. The court in Bartling referenced the DOL opinion letters re-
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As noted above, the four circuits have not agreed about congres-
sional intent, or lack thereof; therefore, for the same reason, the
use of DOL opinion letters is also a subject of debate.
Even assuming that DOL's interpretation should be taken into
account, the dilemma presented by section 104(b)(4) is not re-
solved. DOL's opinion letters have only added to the confusion
that surrounds the issue of disclosure. In 1982, DOL responded
to a request for information regarding the required disclosure of
trustee meeting minutes. 59 The response was accurate yet un-
helpful. If the trustees discussed a matter relating to the estab-
lishment or the operation of the plan, such as the establishment
of a claims procedure, this portion of the minutes must be dis-
closed under the provision. 60 If no such information was ad-
dressed, then the trustees were not obligated to disclose the
minutes. 16 ' In 1987, DOL reaffirmed the same opinion given
five years previously.
162
The opinion letters do not shed light on the section 104(b)(4)
debate for two reasons. First, they do not address whether the
trustee minutes as a whole must be disclosed upon request.
Second, the disagreement between the circuits focuses on the
meaning of the terms "relating to the establishment or the oper-
ation of the plan."' The claims procedure is only one of poten-
garding the required disclosure to participants but held that the letters were inappo-
site. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1070.
159. See Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Opinion Letter 82-33A
(1982), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, ERISA File, cited in Bartling, 29 F.3d at
1070.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Opinion Letter 87-10A, 6
Pens. & Profit Sharing 2d (RIA) 90,279 (1987), cited in Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1070.
This letter is also cited in Faircloth, but no further conclusion was reached because
both the majority and the dissent agreed that the participant's request for three
years of trustee meeting minutes was overly broad. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing
Co., 91 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
163. Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139,.145 (2d Cir.
1997); Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 653; Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Comm. v. Adminis-
trator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1676 (1996); Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1069.
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tially countless trustee discussions that an administrator would
be obligated to disclose. Even if the entire set of trustee meeting
minutes is not required, the DOL opinion letters provide no
further guidance on what discussions would satisfy the section
104(b)(4) requirement.
DOL has, however, reached two firm decisions. First, when
disclosure of documents is demanded, the information can be
released to third parties upon authorization by the beneficia-
ry." The second decision appears to be a breakthrough be-
cause, after reviewing legislative history, DOL took a firm
stance and determined that:
any document or instrument that specifies procedures, formu-
las, methodologies, or schedules to be applied in determining
or calculating a participant's or beneficiary's benefit entitle-
ment under an employee benefit plan would constitute an
instrument under which the plan [is] established or operated,
regardless of whether such information is contained in a
document designated as the "plan document."1"
Although it is risky to draw firm conclusions on the basis of only
one affirmative decision, this language suggests that DOL ap-
pears to be moving toward a stance requiring broader disclosure.
CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Why did the four circuits reach different conclusions concern-
ing the disclosure required under section 104(b)(4)? The first
answer to this question, addressed above, is that the courts have
stressed different methods of statutory construction.
166
164. See Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Opinion Letter 82-21A
(1982), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, ERISA File, cited in Bartling, 29 F.3d at
1070.
165. Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Opinion Letter 96-14A, 6 Pens. &
Profit Sharing 2d (RIA) % 90,589 (1996).
166. See supra notes 50-155 and accompanying text.
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Textualism: The Formalist Approach to Statutory Construction
The first tier of statutory interpretation, allegedly employed
by all four courts, is the plain meaning approach. A primary
advocate of this method, and the founder of what one commenta-
tor termed "the new textualism," is Justice Antonin Scalia. 6
Justice Scalia believes that there is no need to consult legisla-
tive history if the statutory language is clear.168 If the judicia-
ry must seek guidance outside of the language of the provision
in question, then according to Justice Scalia, only the following
techniques are acceptable: looking to the structure of the stat-
ute; reviewing interpretations given to other, similar provisions;
and consulting the canons of statutory construction.
169
For the limited purposes of this Note, the canons can be sum-
marized as three basic concepts. First, inclusion of one thing
should be considered as the exclusion of another (expressio unius
est exclusio alterius).'7 ° Second, the specific should prevail over
the general. 1 Finally, each word, clause, and provision of a
statute must be given effect.'72 In addition to the canons of
statutory construction, Justice Scalia is also willing to give con-
text to the statute through the use of grammar books and
dictionaries.73
As discussed above, each of the four circuits applied their
interpretation of the plain meaning approach. In Bartling, for
example, the court held that the participants were entitled to
the actuarial report "under the plain language of [section
104(b)(4)1." 174 In a similar remark, the Ninth Circuit majority
in Hughes stated that it began its analysis by relying on the
167. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 624.
170. See Jeffrey A. Branch, The Danger of Ignoring Plain Meaning: Individual Re-
lief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1233, 1279
(1995).
171. See id. at 1282.
172. See id. at 1283.
173. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 669.
174. Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994).
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ordinary language of the statute.175 The Faircloth opinion
started with a listing of the dictionary definitions of each word
within the key phrase of section 104(b)(4). 176 Finally, in
Weinstein, the Second Circuit began its substantive discussion
with the same listing of the various definitions of the word "in-
strument" previously set forth by the Fourth Circuit. 177 The
fact that the four circuits used what they considered to be a
plain meaning approach to reach varying conclusions should
caution against sole reliance upon it.
Though Justice Scalia's approach appears to have faltered in
this context, his "new textualism" has the marked benefit of
causing the Supreme Court to rethink its role in the context of
statutory construction. 178 This method has not garnered unani-
mous support, but it has opened the door to "exciting analytical
possibilities,"'79 which, this Note argues, allow the judiciary to
consider using the pragmatic inquiry later proposed. 8 '
The textualist approach may have revitalized statutory inter-
pretation, but even if applied as mandated by Scalia, many prob-
lems exist. The first, and most important, is that language is
sometimes ambiguous, and consequently words have different
dictionary definitions. 8' An extraordinary example of this
arose in the Fourth Circuit in Faircloth.8 2 As noted above, the
majority itself conducted a word by word "analysis" of the key
175. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686, 689
(9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that the statutory construction of ERISA "must
begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordi-
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose" (cita-
tions omitted)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996).
176. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
177. See Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 142 (2d
Cir. 1997).
178. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 624.
179. Id. at 667.
180. See infra notes 220-48 and accompanying text. Ironically, this proposal would
probably be vigorously opposed by Justice Scalia. See infra text accompanying note
210.
181. See Richard Rouco, Commentary, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section
502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV. 631, 666 (1994) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Stat-
utes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 418-19 (1989)).
182. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
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phrase of section 104(b)(4), relying on definitions set forth in
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's New World Dictionary."
The litigants each included their own version of dictionary con-
struction: the appellees argued in favor of using Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary in defining "instrument;" 4 the appel-
lants criticized this usage, claiming that Black's Law Dictionary
is a superior authority." The court apparently tried to ap-
pease both sides by looking to each litigant's dictionary of
choice," but the problems in relying upon dictionary defini-
tions to elicit the clear meaning of the text are clear.
The textualist approach can raise other less glaringly obvious
problems. Textualists construe the statute as a whole in order to
gain an understanding of one provision. The problem with this
approach is that in promulgating the statute, Congress may
have chosen purposely to leave gaps, with the understanding
that the judiciary will fill them in depending on the facts pre-
sented. "7 Furthermore, textualists assume that internal con-
sistency within a statute exists, when, in fact, such consistency
may be missing due to a variety of factors." Finally, even if
the statute is consistent, the judiciary is still obligated to make
a primary selection of the interpretation,'89 which leads the in-
terpreter back to the word ambiguity problem.
The "formalist" method of statutory interpretation also suffers
from its own set of formalist problems. In the eighteenth centu-
ry, the practice of statutory interpretation was not to limit inter-
pretation to plain meaning, but to allow for judicial elaboration
of statutes." The use of the canons of statutory construction is
also problematic. First, these canons emanate from the judicial
process and can be manipulated as easily as the legislative his-
183. See 1d.
184. See Brief for Appellee at 14, Faircloth (No. 95-1275).
185. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 6 n.1, Faircloth (No. 95-1275).
186. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 653.
187. See Rouco, supra note 181, at 666-67.
188. See id. at 667 (noting the influence of interest groups, compromise, and irra-
tionality on legislation).
189. See id.
190. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 670-71.
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tory that Scalia abhors.191 Furthermore, no indication exists
that Congress has these canons of statutory construction in
mind when it develops statutes.192 To assume otherwise is to
engage in what Justice Scalia calls a "benign fiction."93
In the ERISA arena, the Supreme Court recently has rejected
the textualist approach. Initially, in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates,'" the textualist approach yielded a decision that no
individual claims for relief existed under ERISA section
502(a)(3).' 95 The four Justices dissenting from Justice Scalia's
opinion'96 split with the majority about the importance of
ERISA's legislative history in construing the statute.197 The
dissenting viewpoint in Mertens, however, gained favor three
years later in Varity Corp. v. Howe 98 in which the Court held
that the wronged participants were entitled to individual relief
under ERISA section 502.199
Legislative History: Only a Partial Response to Textualism
The problems with textualism often force judges to move to the
next level of analysis-legislative history.2°° As discussed ear-
lier, this was the route taken by three of the four courts to con-
strue ERISA section 104(b)(4) because of its ambiguous lan-
guage.20' The basic theory supporting the use of legislative his-
191. See id. at 674-75.
192. Judge Abner Mikva wrote: "When I was in Congress, the only 'canons' we
talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight."
Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PriT. L. REV. 627, 629 (1987).
193. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 679 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
194. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
195. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255-58 (explaining that ERISA section 502(a)(3) pre-
cludes awards for compensatory or punitive damages).
196. The lineup of Justices who dissented from Scalia's opinion demonstrates that
the issue of statutory construction cuts across the traditional liberal-conservative lines.
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor. See id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 264-73 (White, J., dissenting).
198. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
199. See id. at 515.
200. See generally Eskridge, supra note 167, at 686 (arguing that although there
are advantages to the Scalia approach, textualism must be modified to allow for the
use of legislative history when, among other circumstances, there are two or more
plausible meanings for the words in a statutory provision).
201. See supra notes 66-68, 86-89, 102-03, 147-48 and accompanying text. The
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tory suggests that in order to understand a statute's meaning, the
interpreter should look beyond the language of the statute to
determine the intent of the writer.22 This theory was well sum-
marized by Justice Frankfurter: "A statute, like other living or-
ganisms, derives significance and sustenance from its environ-
ment, from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated.
Especially is this true where the statute, like the one before us, is
part of a legislative process having a history and a purpose."0 '
In the area of pension benefits, Congress recognized an imbal-
ance of power between employer and worker, which neither mar-
ket mechanisms nor the developing common law was able to cor-
rect.2" As discussed previously, this imbalance was part of the
driving force behind the enactment of ERISA and is particularly
why ERISA requires disclosure by trustees."5 As to section
104(b)(4), the legislative history anticipates that employees re-
ceive enough information to ensure that they can "police their
plans."0 6 Congress also believed that the threat of disclosure
would itself be effective:
[Tihe safeguarding effect of the fiduciary responsibility section
will operate efficiently only if fiduciaries are aware that the
details of their dealings will be open to inspection, and that
individual participants and beneficiaries will be armed with
enough information to enforce their own rights as well as the
obligations owed by the fiduciary to the plan in general.2°
Fourth Circuit was the only court to conlcude that the language was unambiguous, a
conclusion sharply criticized by Judge Michael. See supra notes 117-18.
202. See William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 865 (1993).
203. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Several modem critics of the plain meaning approach, and specifically of new
textualism, also argue that context is necessary because statutory terms are not self-
defining, and words have no meaning without interpretation. See Eskridge, supra
note 167, at 669; see also Rouco, supra note 181, at 664-65 (quoting the criticism set
forth by Sunstein, supra note 181, at 416).
204. See Fisk, supra note 15, at 159 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
205. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
206. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649;
S. REP. No. 127, at 27 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4863.
207. H.R. REP. No. 93-533.
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The open question is, of course, what documents are needed in
order to achieve the enumerated goals? In the Senate Report's
discussion of the disclosure requirements, the legislative history
indicates that the participant must have access to "underlying
plan documents, such as bargaining agreements [and] trust
agreements." 8 This statement logically encourages the reader
to construe the key provision narrowly. Unfortunately, Congress
did not stop there. The legislative history also includes the fol-
lowing statement: "The participant may obtain from the admin-
istrator a copy of any or all underlying documents relating to the
plan upon the payment of a reasonable charge .... 2 9 The
earlier inference that Congress intended only bargaining and
trust agreements is destroyed by the next sentence broaden-
ing-and making ambiguous-the disclosure requirements.
Although there are benefits in looking to legislative history,
Congress's intended result under ERISA section 104(b)(4) is un-
clear. Even if the legislative history were clear, however, this
would not solve the issue. Many legal scholars, including, of
course, Justice Scalia, argue that legislative history is not an
appropriate method of interpreting statutes. Justice Scalia's ar-
gument against using legislative history stems from his views on
the separation of powers. Scalia argues that when the judiciary
looks to legislative history, it exercises discretion at the expense
of the legislature's promulgated statute, and democratic gover-
nance is threatened.210 Scalia also argues that legislative histo-
ry is irrelevant to. the Court's decision making,21 and that it
lacks Congress's "imprimatur" because the representatives pay
little attention to statements made in committee reports. 2
208. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 28 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4864.
209. Id.
210. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 649-50. Such criticism would also apply to
the proposal made in this Note for a pragmatic judicial inquiry. See infra notes 220-
48 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the response to this objection is that
the application of the contextual methods that Scalia is willing to accept, such as
the use of canons of statutory interpretation, also allows for judicial discretion. See
supra text, accompanying notes 181-86.
211. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, "510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 650 n.114 (explaining that this argument by
Justice Scalia first appeared in Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
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At least three other criticisms of legislative history exist.
First, Judge Frank Easterbrook, in his "public choice" model,21
rejects legislative history on three grounds:214 (1) because legis-
latures are comprised of many members, they have no legislative
purpose, but instead "only outcomes";215 (2) legislation is the
result of compromise rather than of individual purpose;"' and
(3) statutes are merely the result of private interest bargaining,
not the result of congressional purpose."
Second, realists criticize legislative history, stating that the
collective intent is, by definition, only a construction of the in-
terpreter because legislatures do not have a determinative col-
lective expectation."' Third, there is criticism from a historical
perspective: it is impossible to reconstruct collective intent be-
cause the interpreter will invariably be influenced by the cur-
rent context in which the decision is reached."9
THESIS: PROPOSING ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
With the litany of criticisms made of the two traditional meth-
ods of statutory interpretation, what is left? This Note proposes
that courts should employ a third-tier approach in interpreting
section 104(b)(4). Both textualists and those using legislative
history have an Article I22. perspective because both look ex-
clusively to the legislature for guidance.22' The pragmatic judi-
cial inquiry suggested by this Note would force the judiciary to
while he was sitting on the District of Columbia Circuit).
213. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983).
214. See Popkin, supra note 202, at 870.
215. Easterbrook, supra note 213, cited in Popkin, supra note 202, at 870.
216. See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987), cited in Popkin, supra
note 202, at 870.
217. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword- The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-18, 44, 54 (1984), cited in Popkin, supra note 202, at 870.
218. See Eskridge, supra note 167, at 642.
219. See id. at 644.
220. Article I refers to Article I of the U.S. Constitution in which legislative power
is vested in the Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
221. See Popkin, supra note 202, at 865 n.3.
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take an Article III,222 "reader-based approach."' Such an ap-
proach would have particular relevance in the difficult area of
disclosure under section 104(b)(4).
The Theory Behind a Searching Judicial Inquiry
The theory behind this pragmatic approach is to abandon the
fiction of legislatively determined statutory meaning and to
recognize that, in reality, courts "mak[e] decisions with little
legislative guidance."2" Proceeding with this assumption, judg-
es have a responsibility to read a statute and accept a law-mak-
ing authority beyond that granted by the legislature." One of
the important benefits of such a reader-based approach is that it
reminds the judiciary that its interpretive choice is a responsible
act.
226
As one scholar has noted, searching judicial inquiry is par-
ticularly appropriate in instances in which "the facts to which
the statute might be applied did not exist at the time of the
statute's adoption."27 In Faircloth, the participants were part
of an ESOP, 25 which as discussed above, is a defined contri-
bution plan.229 When Congress wrote section 104(b)(4), there
were very few defined contribution plans, especially those as
risky as the ESOP. Employers have only recently begun the
trend towards defined contribution plans, which shift the risk
of loss to the participant.20 Faircloth thus presents optimal
222. Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests power in the federal judiciary. See
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
223. Popkin, supra note 202, at 865.
224. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?
A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 39 n.19
(1996).
225. See Popkin, supra note 202, at 867 (citing John Choon Yoo, Marshall's Plan:
The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1630
n.135 (1992)). In his article, Choon argued that plenary judicial power stems from
the Marshall Courts early "suggestion that certain powers inhere to courts qua
courts." Yoo, supra, at 1630 n.15.
226. See Popkin, supra note 202, at 867.
227. Id. at 878.
228. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997).
229. See supra text accompanying note 38.
230. See Keville, supra note 20, at 534-43 (explaining the recent shift by employers
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circumstances for employing a searching judicial inquiry.
The Proposed Inquiry for Determining Whether Disclosure is
Mandated under ERISA Section 104(b)(4)
This Note proposes that the judiciary employ the following
five-prong inquiry in order to determine the level of disclosure
required for defined contribution plans under section
104(b)(4):"' (1) why the employee sought disclosure of the doc-
uments; (2) whether a reasonable employee would have made a
similar request; (3) why the employer refused disclosure; (4)
whether the employer was reasonable in refusing to grant the
employee's request; and (5) the general effects on society of the
judicial decision on disclosure.
The first and third prongs of the test are straightforward.
Prong one requires the court to review the employees' cited
reasons for requesting the documents. Similarly, the third
prong requires the court to conduct a review of each reason
cited by the employer supporting its refusal to disclose the re-
quested documents.
The remainder of the inquiry is much more difficult. Prongs
two and four require the court to make a determination of
"reasonableness." Admittedly, this is a nebulous standard;
however, the reasonableness standard is commonly used, in
legal analysis, particularly in the area of tort law. This Note
proposes that the "reasonable man" standard that serves as an
element in determining negligence in torts2 should also ap-
toward defined contribution plans).
231. This Note distinguishes defined benefit plans, such as that which existed in
Hughes. See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Administrator of Hughes, 72 F.3d 686,* 688
(9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996). The premise is that a
searching judicial inquiry is less important with respect to defined benefit plans be-
cause Congress originally geared its rulemaking protection toward the defined benefit
plan, and employers bear the risk of investment loss and, hence, have an enormous
added incentive to make wise investments. Employees therefore are less in need of
protection in defined benefit plans than they are in defined contribution plans. This
phenomenon was demonstrated in Hughes: the employees' disclosure requests were
only made to help them negotiate or litigate for increased guaranteed benefits. See
id.
232. "T]he standard below which conduct must not fall if it is to avoid being negli-
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ply to both an employee and an employer in the section
104(b)(4) disclosure context.
When a court makes a determination regarding a defendant's
negligence, the court must determine whether a hypothetical
reasonable man would have acted in a similar manner. 3 This
Note suggests that a court faced with a document disclosure is-
sue under section 104(b)(4) should ask the same question: would
a hypothetical reasonable employer or employee have acted in a
similar manner when presented with the same facts?
In tort law, the definition of a "reasonable man" can vary ac-
cording to certain factors. For example, a court will modify the
reasonable man standard for a child, unless the child is engaging
in adult activities. 34 Just as the tort definition varies depending
on circumstances, this Note proposes a similar variation depend-
ing on distinctive factors in the employer-employee relationship.
In reviewing a disclosure request, a court should look at fac-
tors such as: whether the corporation is unionized, so that em-
ployees have third party protection; whether the employer is a
large, publicly-traded corporation, in which the employee would
know little of management's actions, or a small, closely-held
corporation, in which the employee would have access to more
information; and whether the employee has access to those
who make decisions, such that he can address questions re-
garding a corporation's operations directly rather than being
forced to demand document disclosure in order to answer his
questions. Although these factors will vary depending on the
facts and circumstances of each case, the three factors present-
ed above offer some standard questions that a court can ask in
making its determination.
The final prong of the proposed test calls for a pure policy
analysis. The following list is a sample of the types of issues
that a court could address in reaching its decision: (1) whether
gence . . . is ordinarily measured by what the reasonably prudent person would do
in the circumstances. As everyone knows, this reasonable person is a creature of the
law's imagination. He is an abstraction." 3 FAUTER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 16.2, at 389 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1961); Dunn v. Teti,
421 A-2d 782, 783-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
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its decision would tend to encourage or discourage unionization;
(2) whether its decision would tend to encourage or discourage
negotiations; (3) whether its decision would shift the balance of
power either toward or away from employees, depending on
their bargaining position; (4) whether its decision would tend to
increase or decrease the role of the federal government in pro-
tecting employees; and (5) how its decision would effectuate the
goals of ERISA, balancing congressional intent to arm employees
with the ability to police their plan with the congressional intent
to encourage employers to create more plans. These factors are
general questions which could aid courts. The application of this
prong, however, will again vary based on the individual circum-
stances of each case.
A Demonstration of the Test: Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.
Faircloth can be used as a case in point to demonstrate the
use of the proposed test for defined contribution plans. The
employees' reason for requesting disclosure was straightforward:
their account values fell as the result of a forty-two percent drop
in Lundy stock in the span of a year. 5 The plaintiffs also
wanted the documents in order to give them to the representa-
tive of the UFCW. 6 Any reasonable employee would seek
company documents if his retirement plan suffered such a signif-
icant loss, especially in light of the fact that the company still
earned a two million dollar profit. A reasonable employee would
also likely be inclined to seek the aid of another to explain the
information if he was unable to understand it himself.
The employees' reasons for seeking disclosure were few and
235. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997). A 42% stock drop is distinguishable, for example, from
a situation in which the company's stock drops only 2%. In this situation, large-scale
employee reaction and request for documentation without other extenuating circum-
stances would not be reasonable. Nor would seeking the documentation for the pur-
pose of selling the information to a competitor be reasonable.
236. See Brief for Appellee at 9, Faircloth (No. 95-1275) (explaining that Faircloth
testified in her deposition that she would give any documents that she received to
the UFCW).
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straightforward, but the employer presented several reasons to
explain its refusal to disclose the documents. First, the employer
argued that some of the documents contained sensitive financial
information, which they argued was particularly a problem for
ESOPs because those plans often contain more sensitive infor-
mation. 7 This argument does not seem reasonable because
the stress on extra protection for ESOPs is not convincing. The
balance of power is clearly shifted in favor of the employer, who
can choose whatever type of plan it wants. Second, the argument
that confidentiality is necessary also falls short because the em-
ployer already had provided other participants with the informa-
tion sought by the plaintiffs." 8
Lundy also argued that there was no need to provide the doc-
uments because the information sought by the participants was
listed on the Form 5500. 9 The problem with this argument is
that the information is reproduced on the Form 5500. There is
no way for the participants to review the Form 5500 for accuracy
without the original documents, such as the IRS determination
letter. The employer also argued that the provision of the docu-
ments would have been unduly burdensome. This argument is
difficult to accept because section 104(b)(4) contains a provision
that the employee must pay the document copying costs.'
Furthermore, these documents should not be that difficult to
locate because the employer is required to retain the records and
file them with the DOL under ERISA section 107. 1
237. See id. at 21-22.
238. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Faircloth (No. 95-1275). Even if the employer had
not already provided the documents, this Note argues that the employees should be
entitled to confidential documents upon demonstration of a valid reason, much like
shareholders are entitled to business records upon showing a proper purpose. This
was precisely the position adopted by Judge Michael in his dissenting opinion on
section 104(b)(4). See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 665 (Michael, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
239. See Brief for Appellee at 26-29, Faircloth (No. 95-1275).
240. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1994).
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 1027 (1994). Although this Note concludes that Lundy Packing
Co. was unreasonable in its refusal, there are legitimate situations in which the em-
ployer should not be required to disclose documents to its employees. For example, if
the employer denied disclosure of the documents in order to protect a trade secret,
this would be reasonable behavior.
Another example of reasonable behavior on the part on an employer was pre-
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The final prong of the inquiry focuses on the potential results
of the judiciary's decision regarding disclosure. If DOL has re-
ceived the documents in question, but the employees have not,
DOL will bear the burden of reviewing the information to police
the plan. DOL will have no choice but to conduct some type of
review in light of the danger presented by ESOPs and because
there are numerous examples of ESOP abuse.' 2 Should the
federal government bear the burden of review, or should the em-
ployees and their representatives be allowed to look out for their
own interests? In an era of government downsizing, the latter
option would certainly appear to be more successful. This option
is especially attractive in light of the employees' incentive to
conduct a vigilant review. Further, this option would be less ex-
pensive for taxpayers.
A decision in favor of the employees would also have given
them more leverage with which to bargain in the following
year before the corporation made decisions that would affect
stock value. This shift in power in favor of the employees and
the ensuing negotiations would likely decrease litigation costs,
creating an overall benefit to society. Finally, this decision
would also effectuate the ERISA policy of protecting the em-
ployees and would not likely deter the employer from retaining
the plan because of the added capital that the plan brings to
the corporation.2"
sented in Board of Trustees of CWAIITU v. Weinstein: in light of the volume of in-
formation presented in the actuarial valuation reports, Foss photocopied the table of
contents and sent it to Weinstein in a valid attempt to narrow down the information
to be furnished. See Board of Trustees of CWA/ITU v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 140
(2d Cir. 1997).
242. See, e.g., Zabolotny v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1993) (de-
scribing the illegal sale of property to an ESOP); see also Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d
660, 671 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing violations of fiduciary duties under ERISA in
connection with transaction involving ESOP); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing illegal stock transfers on ESOP).
243. "Use of an ESOP provides a corporation with a cheap and ready source of capi-
tal that may be used for expansion, to pay down debt, or (as may be the case with a
closely-held corporation) to buy out a minority shareholder." Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 662
(Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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Anticipated Criticisms of the Proposed Inquiry
The result of the pragmatic inquiry would have been to allow
the Lundy participants access to many more of the documents
than they received. The arguments against the approach would
be numerous, and some of them may indeed be valid. First of
all, in using this type of approach, the opinions of individual
judges would more likely come into play, which undermines the
legitimacy of the court.2' The second very real problem is that
courts simply may not be sufficiently competent in the ERISA
area to make a reasoned decision."
A third argument certainly could be made that the balance
between the three branches of government will be threat-
ened;2" however, the argument also applies equally to a review
of legislative history, and even to some of the other methods of
statutory construction to which textualists are willing to
look. 7 Finally, charges of inefficiency might also be made be-
cause the proposed inquiry would be more time consuming than
the traditional statutory construction analysis.'
A Final Alternative: Amending the Statute
If the judiciary is unwilling to conduct the proposed pragmatic
inquiry, Congress could also resolve the current problem by
amending ERISA. One such method would simply be to modify
section 104(b)(4) by enumerating all documents that must be
244. See Fisk, supra note 224, at 97-98 (explaining the fear of judicial activism, but
also noting that "the use of dictionaries does not constrain judicial activism."). In
Faircloth, for example, the judges comprising the majority inserted their own opinion
when they chose particular dictionary definitions for their explanation of the
statute's "plain meaning." See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 653.
245. See Fisk, supra note 224, at 97.
246. See id. at 96 (discussing the argument of textualists that judges can not judi-
cially fix an error of Congress, because this is not the job of the courts).
247. See supra notes 187, 211 and accompanying text (discussing various construc-
tions permitted by textualists).
248. The searching inquiry proposed in this Note also could occur through the me-
diation process, which is a particularly appropriate method of resolving disputes for
parties in an ongoing employer-employee relationship. See Cindy C. Ettingoff &
Gregory Powell, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment-Related Dis-
putes, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1131, 1135 n.15 (1996) (noting the high success rate in
mediating employment disputes). The use of mediation would also alleviate costs.
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disclosed and eliminating the phrase "other instruments under
which the plan is established or operated." This would decrease
the judiciary's role and would create clear black letter law. A
second option is related to the summary plan document. Con-
gress could modify the requirements and increase automatic
disclosure in the SPD itself. The benefit of amending ERISA is
that consistent results would ensue. Furthermore, because
ERISA is such a technically complex statute, deference to the
legislature might be the best option. 9 The problem with sug-
gesting an amendment to ERISA is that it is difficult to per-
suade Congress to modify a flawed statute such as section
104(b)(4) because interests in the political process naturally
coalesce around the benefits of the existing law, even if it is
flawed.5
CONCLUSION
The American worker fears for his pension today, and in light
of facts such as those presented in Varity Corp. v. Howe,"' the
fear is understandable. This fear has manifested itself in partici-
pant requests for the disclosure of plan documents to be used to
police employers. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, such a re-
quest would never have been acceptable. 2 Today, the avail-
ability of such requests under section 104(b)(4) has resulted in a
circuit split regarding the breadth of disclosure under this sec-
tion. The courts have failed to reach a consensus using the plain
meaning of the statute or its legislative history.
The real reason for these inconsistent results is that statutory
construction is simply not neat and scientific. An attempt to
treat statutes as if they are is, in reality, an abdication of judi-
249. See Popkin, supra note 202, at 888 (stating that "[a] judicial decision to allo-
cate law-making responsibility to the legislature makes sense when the legislature is
aware of a technically complex or politically controversial issue").
250. See Fisk, supra note 224, at 99 (explaining that in the world of ERISA, it is
easier for Congress to enact new provisions than to modify existing, flawed statutory
provisions after enactment).
251. 516 U.S. 489 (1996); see supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
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cial responsibility, which in this instance disserves pension plan
beneficiaries. This Note proposes that courts conduct a five-
prong inquiry to review the reasons and soundness behind each
party's position and to determine the larger effects of its decision
regarding disclosure.
In the event that the courts are unwilling to modify their
approach to statutory construction, Congress can also amend
ERISA. This could be done either through an amendment to the
provision at issue or by broadening the automatic disclosure
requirements for the SPD. As pension funds represent at least
twenty-eight percent of all equity capital in the U.S. econo-
my,253 the issue of who will monitor the fund investors certain-
ly merits the close attention of Congress if the courts are un-
willing to resolve the issue.
Anne-Marie M. Miles
253. See Rouco, supra note 181, at 631 (footnote omitted).
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